Naïve realism about unconscious perception

Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception

Unconscious Perception and Perceptual Knowledge

It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism explains the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception

Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji

This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly expressed without the employment of disjunction

Alternatywizm, dysjunktywizm i pluralizm doświadczeniowy

The claim currently known as “disjunctivism” is usually interpreted in terms of exclusive disjunction. However, it can be also explicated through the lens of alternative denial. The aim of this paper is to show that the latter interpretation is more accurate. Firstly, it reflects the core of disjunctivism more precisely. Secondly, it reduces metaphysical weight of the claim, thereby making it more plausible

In Search of the Holy Grail of Epistemology

Pritchard calls his epistemological disjunctivism ‘the holy grail of epistemology’. What this metaphor means is that the acceptance of this thesis puts the internalism-externalism debate to an end, thanks to satisfaction of intuitions standing behind both competing views. Simultaneously, Pritchard strongly emphasizes that the endorsement of epistemological disjunctivism does not commit one to metaphysical disjunctivism. In this paper I analyze the formulations and motivations of epistemological disjunctivism presented by Pritchard and McDowell. Then I consider the most common argument for the claim that epistemological disjunctivism can be held without the support of metaphysical disjunctivism. I conclude that the plausibility of epistemological disjunctivism depends on the plausibility of metaphysical disjunctivism. If the latter is false, the former postulates a set of conditions for epistemic justification that are impossible to be fulfilled

Different approach to determination of pyrethroid pesticides in ornamental plants

The aim of the presented research was to develop and optimize a methodology, particularly dedicated for the quantification of pyrethroids in ornamental plant material on the basis of a rose (Rosa hybrid) with the use of HPLC chromatography and QuEChERS extraction method. High repeatability and reproducibility of the results were obtained by using acetonitrile as an eluent. The determined limits of detection and quantification for deltamethrin equal 5.2 ng and 9.3 ng per 1 cm3 of analysed solution respectively. For cypermethrin these values were: LOD 1.2 ng, LOQ 5.0 ng per 1 cm3 of solution. It has been shown that solutions of deltamethrin and cypermethrin are of high stability – they can be stored at room temperature for as long as 28 days without a change in the concentration. The experiments presented showed that the QuEChERS extraction of deltamethrin from the tested samples can be performed with efficiency above 93% using acetonitrile as a solvent, magnesium sulphate and sodium acetate as the separation salts. For purification Supel ™ QUE sorbent by Supelco was successfully applied. The described analytical method may be a valuable and relatively cheap tool to control the amounts of these pesticides sprayed in environment, wherever there is a suspicion of their excessive use

Józef Ignacy Kraszewski jako wydawca listów i pamiętników

Artykuł dotyczy redaktorskich ingerencji Józefa Ignacego Kraszewskiego w edycje listów i pamiętników. Za materiał badawczy posłużyły listy Urszuli hrabiny z Zamoyskich Mniszchowej (1866), listy Alojzego Felińskiego (1872), dokumenty Sądu Sejmowego pod przewodnictwem Piotra Bielińskiego (1873), sybiracki pamiętnik Jakuba Kazimierza Gieysztora (1873), listy Jana Śniadeckiego (1878) i Ignacego Krasickiego (opublikowane w poświęconej mu monografii pióra Kraszewskiego w 1878 roku) oraz korespondencja Zygmunta Krasińskiego z Konstantym Gaszyńskim (1882). W zestawieniu z materiałem rękopiśmiennym oraz analogicznymi wydaniami konkurenta Kraszewskiego – Michała Balińskiego (listy Jana Śniadeckiego), zostały omówione decyzje redaktorskie pisarza

Does logical possibility entail metaphysical possibility?

According to Chalmers, the argument from the conceivability of philosophical zombies disproves materialism in the philosophy of mind. This claim depends on the assumption that conceivability (logical possibility) entails metaphysical possibility. Such entailment is incorrect, however, because a materialist might formulate an analogous argument from the conceivability of anti-zombies. A clash between two mutually excluding logical possibilities prevents one from inferring a metaphysical possibility from any of them

The Game Chromatic Number of Complete Multipartite Graphs with No Singletons

In this paper we investigate the game chromatic number for complete multipartite graphs. We devise several strategies for Alice, and one strategy for Bob, and we prove their optimality in all complete multipartite graphs with no singletons. All the strategies presented are computable in linear time, and the values of the game chromatic number depend directly only on the number and the sizes of sets in the partition